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Federal Right to Try Act: Heightened Informed
Consent and Price Regulation Measures
Will Improve Quality, Autonomy, and
Exploitation Issues
Brenda Lin*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note will examine the federal Right to Try Act, which was enacted
on May 30, 2018. The federal statute followed the passage of Right to Try
legislation in thirty-eight states, including California.1 Much controversy has
surrounded “Right to Try” as an alternative to preexisting pathways to
investigational drug treatments, such as traditional clinical trials and the
FDA2-regulated Expanded Access program, also commonly known as
“Compassionate Use.”3
Previously, the Expanded Access program was the only pathway
outside of clinical trials to provide terminally ill patients with a last chance
at survival with non-FDA approved experimental drug treatments.4
Proponents contend that the “Right to Try” pathway is a more streamlined
method of providing access to experimental drugs, free from burdensome
paperwork and FDA regulation. However, prior to the bill being enacted by
Congress, over one hundred patient’s rights groups opposed it.5
This Note will examine those criticisms, evaluate the federal Right to
*J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2020; B.A. Political
Science/Law and Society, University of California, Riverside, 2014.
1. Jacqueline Howard, What you need to know about right to try legislation, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018,
1:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html.
2. Food and Drug Administration.
3. Jacqueline Howard, What you need to know about right to try legislation, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018,
1:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html; Michael
Nedelman & Jacqueline Howard, ‘Right-to-Try’ bill passes Congress, CNN, (May 29, 2018, 1:48 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/health/right-to-try-legislation-congress/index.html.
4. Michael Nedelman & Jacqueline Howard, ‘Right-to-Try’ bill passes Congress, CNN, (May 29,
2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/health/right-to-try-legislation-congress/index.html.
5. Letter from A Twist of Fae-ATS et al., Patient and Provider Orgs., to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S.
House of Reps. & Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Reps (May 21, 2018), https://www.
acscan.org/sites/default/files/National%20Documents/Senate%20Right%20to%20Try%20%28S.204%2
9%20Coalition%20Opposition%20Letter%205.21.2018.pdf.
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Try Act, and propose amendments through the lenses of health care quality,
patient autonomy, and long-term scientific innovation. Some controversy
stems from the federal Right to Try Act, which affirmatively absolves drug
companies of legal liability in order to incentivize them to participate in
Right to Try programs. This feature is yet to be proven effective and raises
red flags in patients’ rights. This Note proposes to amend the federal Right
to Try Act to include a comprehensive informed consent section mimicking
both the California’s Right to Try Act and the safeguards used in the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act. Additionally, the business structure that the federal
Right to Try Act creates brings about exploitation concerns and exposes
vulnerable patients to serious financial risks. Lastly, this Note proposes to
amend the federal Right to Try Act to include anti-price gouging language
and to re-incorporate FDA oversight of charging as safeguards against
exploitation.

II. FDA APPROVAL OF INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
In the 1950s, a German company, Chemie Grünenthal, developed
thalidomide and marketed the drug in Europe as the first safe sleeping pill.6
Thalidomide was also seen as a highly effective treatment for pregnant
women with morning sickness, and it gained widespread popularity in
Europe.7 The first known victim of thalidomide was a girl born with no ears
in 1956, though the cause was not discovered until years later.8
Progressively, thousands of mothers who had taken thalidomide while
pregnant gave birth to thousands of children born with extreme
disfigurations.9 Thalidomide-affected children were born with flipper-like
arms and legs, which some parents had amputated in order to accommodate
for prosthetic limbs.10 Other parents rejected thalidomide-affected children
and had them institutionalized, and in one case, a young mother and her
doctor were charged with the mercy killing of her deformed child.11 The
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) reviewed thalidomide for drug
approval in 1960, but delayed approval due to lack of rigorous research
supporting the drug’s safety.12 The FDA never approved thalidomide.13 By
6. Michael Winerip, The Death and Afterlife of Thalidomide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013,
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/booming/the-death-and-afterlife-of-thalidomide.html.
7. Id.
8. The girl was born in 1956, but evidence linking thalidomide to birth defects did not become
public until 1961. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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1962, the drug was banned worldwide, and the thalidomide crisis is one
principal reason for the FDA’s strict drug regulation.14
The FDA must approve all drugs introduced into interstate
commerce.15 Although lengthy, the approval process is designed to
thoroughly investigate the safety and efficacy of investigational new drugs
in four clinical trial phases.16 First, drug sponsors submit an Investigational
New Drug (“IND”) application to the FDA to demonstrate that a drug has
been tested on animals and is reasonably safe for initial use on humans.17
Phase I involves a months-long study of the drug’s safety and dosage on
20-100 participants.18 Approximately seventy percent of drugs pass Phase
I.19 Phase II trials test the drug’s efficacy and side effects on up to several
hundred participants for a duration of anywhere between months to two
years.20 Approximately thirty-three percent of drugs pass Phase II.21 Phase
III trials further test drug efficacy in addition to adverse reactions on 300
to 3,000 participants; the duration of the trials last between one to four
years, and only approximately twenty-five to thirty percent of drugs pass
this phase.22 The investigational new drugs then move on to Phase IV,
where the FDA reviews all results from previous phases along with any
additional reports, proposed labeling and directions for use, and safety
updates.23 Under this process, it can take up to ten years for the FDA to
approve a drug for prescription.24
III. ALTERNATIVE ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
The FDA approval process for new drugs takes time, a luxury that some
terminally ill patients cannot afford.25 In response, the FDA created the
14. Id.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) is
effective with respect to such drug.”).
16. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FDA (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/investigationaln
ewdrugindapplication/default.htm.
17. Id.
18. Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals
/Drugs/ucm405622.htm#Clinical_Research_Phase_Studies.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Step 4: FDA Drug Review, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/
Approvals/Drugs/ucm405570.htm.
24. How Long Does the FDA Take to Approve a Drug?, U.S. DEPT. OF VET. AFFS., https://
www.hiv.va.gov/patient/clinical-trials/drug-approval-process.asp (last visited Fed. 23, 2020).
25. Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill to Take Control of Their
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Expanded Access program (“EA”), also known as “Compassionate Use,” to
allow terminally ill patients access to investigational drugs that have not yet
passed the final FDA approval phase.26 States have also responded with
Right to Try legislation, permitting drug companies to provide very sick
patients with Phase I investigational drugs even without EA approval.27
These efforts toward alternative access to investigational drugs came to a
head when Congress enacted The Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan
McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, the federal
counterpart to state Right to Try legislation.28 Through the federal Right to
Try Act, Congress sought to permit drug companies to provide Phase I
investigational drugs to patients with life threatening diseases.29

A. FDA EXPANDED ACCESS POLICY
Under EA, a patient with a serious or life threatening disease left with no
other comparable treatment may have access to an investigational drug.30 The
requirements for this access are that a licensed physician or drug company
must submit an EA application form to the FDA on the patient’s behalf and
find a willing drug company to provide the investigational drug.31 The
physician is responsible for filling out the paperwork, obtaining the patient’s
informed consent pursuant to the codified informed consent elements for
investigational drug use, which must also be reviewed by an Institutional
Review Board (“IRB”), and monitor the course of treatment.32 In approving
the application, the FDA must determine that the potential benefit of the EA
drug use justifies the risks of the treatment, and that providing the drug will
not interfere with the clinical investigations of the drug for marketing
approval.33 In 2017, the FDA approved 1,632 out of 1,637 received EA
applications for investigational drugs.34
Treatment, GOLDWATER INST. (Oct. 7, 2014), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/everyone-deservesright-try-empowering-terminally/.
26. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305 (2009).
27. Daniel A. Kracov et al., National Right to Try Legislation Passes Congress, ARNOLD &
PORTER (May 23, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/05/nationalright-to-try-legislation-passes-congress.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018).
29. Id.
30. 21 C.F.R. § 312.300 (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305 (2009).
31. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) (2009).
32. General responsibilities of investigators, 84 Fed. Reg. 5968-02, 312, 812 (Feb. 25, 2019) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.60); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(1) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4) (2009).
33. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) (2009).
34. CDER, CBER and CDRH Expanded Access INDs and Protocols (2014-2018), FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/publichealthfocus/expandedaccesscompassionateuse/ucm443572.htm#
Expanded_Access_IND1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
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By 2015, in response to repeated criticism to alleviate the administrative
burden of EA requirements, the FDA made efforts to streamline EA
approval.35 The agency introduced simplified application forms that were
purported to take only forty-five minutes for a physician to complete, and
included expedited IRB full-board approval processes for treatment by only
requiring one IRB member to approve treatment.36
Despite these efforts to streamline the EA process, drug companies have
been reluctant to participate in EA in fear that adverse reactions to
investigational drugs will become an obstacle to drug approval.37 To dispel
discouragement, the FDA published guidance for the industry, clarifying that
adverse reactions are reviewed through the FDA approval process under a
causation requirement.38 In the guidance, the FDA reassures that it reviews
adverse events within the context of the treatment, acknowledging how
various uncontrolled factors inherent in EA often create difficulty in linking
treatment to a particular adverse event.39
EA was created to treat very sick patients, but with close FDA
oversight.40 The FDA purportedly approves ninety-nine percent of EA
applications and approves applications within days or even hours over the
phone for emergencies.41 Despite the FDA’s continued efforts to streamline
the EA application process, drug companies remain reluctant to participate.

B. STATE RIGHT TO TRY LEGISLATION
In May 2014, Colorado enacted their Right to Try Act, allowing
terminally ill patients who are unable to participate in clinical trials, and have
exhausted all other methods of treatment, to receive investigational drugs
provided by willing drug manufacturers without FDA approval of the
treatment.42 Since then, forty states have enacted Right to Try legislation,
35. FDA Voices: Perspectives From FDA Experts, FDA, https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/
2017/10/expanded-access-fda-describes-efforts-to-ease-application-process/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2020);
Alexander Gaffney, From 100 Hours to 1: FDA Dramatically Simplifies Its Compassionate Use Process,
REGULATORY AFF. PROF’LS SOC’Y: REGULATORY FOCUS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.raps.org/regula
tory-focus™/news-articles/2015/2/from-100-hours-to-1-fda-dramatically-simplifies-its-compass ionateuse-process.
36. FDA Voices: Perspectives From FDA Experts, FDA, supra note 31.
37. Id.
38. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use—Questions and Answers:
Guidance
for
Industry,
FDA
(June
2016),
available
at
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM3
51261.pdf.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id. at 2.
41. FDA Voices: Perspectives From FDA Experts, FDA, supra note 31.
42. H.B. 14-1281, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Co. 2014); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
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including California.43 As of April 2018, those states are Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.44 The state
versions of the legislation vary, such as Colorado’s and California’s, which
include robust informed consent requirements, whereas other versions, like
Arkansas’s, do not.45 California’s Right to Try Act also includes a section
absolving manufacturers against liability for any injury that results from the
non-negligent investigational drug treatment.46
State efforts to introduce Right to Try investigational drug access were
still not enough as critics considered state Right to Try laws mere “placebo
legislation.”47 Treatment under the Right to Try pathways have gone
unused.48 Drug companies still seemed reluctant to provide investigational
drugs due to concerns that the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act preempted any
state legislation on the subject and for fear of scaring away investors.49 Even
under State Right to Try legislation similar to California’s, drug companies
also feared that any adverse results from the treatment would be used to by
the FDA to pull the drug from the clinical trial process.50

111548.1(h) (West 2017).
43. Jacqueline Howard, What you need to know about right to try legislation, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018,
1:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/health/federal-right-to-try-explainer/index.html.
44. Michael Nedelman & Jacqueline Howard, ‘Right-to-Try’ bill passes Congress, CNN, (May 29,
2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/health/right-to-try-legislation-congress/index.html.
45. 2015 Ark. S.B. 4, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (enacted).
46. H.B. 14-1281, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
111548 (2019).
47. David Gorski, The Very Worst Version of the Sham Known as “Right to Try” is Poised to
Become Law, SCI. BASED MEDICINE (May 21, 2018), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/the-very-worstversion-of-the-sham-known-as-right-to-try-is-poised-to-become-law/.
48. Kate Gallin Heffernan et al., Expanded Access and Right to Try: The Impact of Recent
Legislative Changes, ADVARRA (May 30, 2018), https://www.advarra.com/resource-library/expandedaccess-and-right-to-try-the-impact-of-recent-legislative-changes/.
49. Nicole Van Groningen, The Right-To-Try Bill Puts Patients At Risk In The Name Of Helping
Them, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-vangroni
ngen-righttotry-bill_us_5b0ebcc4e4b0fdb2aa58c732; Marianne Spencer, Prescribing a Cure for Rightto-Try Legislation, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 30 (2018).
50. Sammy Caiola, Federal Right To Try Proposal Could make Califoria Law More Effective, CAP.
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/01/31/federal-right-to-try-proposalcould-make-california-law-more-effective.
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C. FEDERAL RIGHT TO TRY ACT
On May 30, 2018, Congress enacted a federal Right to Try Act,
expanding this alternative pathway to investigational drugs nationwide.51
Similar to the state versions, the federal statute allows anyone with a “life
threatening disease” who has exhausted all other treatment options to receive
investigational drugs past Phase I clinical trial approval from a willing drug
company.52 A “life threatening disease” is defined as a disease or condition
with a high likelihood of death unless the course of the disease is
interrupted.53 The eligible patient must be left with no other option for
treatment, including treatment through clinical trial participation, and must
submit written informed consent to their physician.54
In an attempt to encourage drug companies to provide investigational
drugs to eligible patients, the federal Right to Try Act absolves drug
companies from liability for negligent investigational drug treatment.55
Further, the statute prohibits the FDA from using any clinical outcome
associated with the use of the investigational drug to delay or adversely affect
the ongoing FDA approval of the investigational drug.56 Drug companies are
required to report annual summaries of each investigational drug used, which
includes information regarding any known serious adverse events.57 Serious
adverse events include those involving death, life-threatening adverse
events, inpatient hospitalization, prolongation of existing hospitalization, a
persistent or significant incapacity or substantial disruption of the ability to
function normally, and congenital anomalies or birth defects.58 These serious
adverse events cannot affect the investigational drug’s FDA approval unless
the Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department (“HHS”)
decides that the serious adverse event is critical to determining the
investigational drug’s safety.59 In any case, the Secretary of the HHS must
post an annual summary report of the amount of investigational drugs for
which serious adverse events were or were not reviewed in the FDA approval
process on the FDA website.60 These provisions set out to promote Right to
Try treatment by reducing a drug company’s risk when providing an eligible
patient with an investigational drug.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018).
Id.
21 C.F.R. § 312.81(a)(1); 21 U.C.S. § 360 bbb-0a(a)(1)(A) (2018).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(B) (2018).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(c) (2018).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(d) (2018).
21 C.F.R. § 312.32 (2011).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(c)(1)(A) (2018).
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(d) (2018).
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IV. CRITICISMS OF THE RIGHT TO TRY
Since its introduction, critics have accused the Right to Try campaign
of furthering a hidden agenda to eliminate FDA oversight of drugs.61 When
the FDA monitors investigational drug treatment through EA, it often
changes treatment protocol based on its exclusive expert consultant
information.62 Patient advocates have grown concerned that without FDA
consultation, investigational drug treatment increases risk to patients.63
Safety concerns also stem from the fact that Phase I investigational drugs are
typically only tested on twenty to eighty healthy volunteers, which does not
thoroughly establish the drugs’ safety.64 Finally, unlike EA, which requires
IRB review of treatment protocol and references a list of informed consent
standards for investigational drug treatment, Right to Try laws bypass IRB
review of treatment protocol and do not establish informed consent
standards.65 Taken together, the absence of these safeguards have elicited
over one hundred patient advocacy groups to oppose the federal Right to Try
Act.66
These one hundred patient and provider groups expressed their strong
opposition to the Senate version of the Right to Try Act—which is now the
enacted federal Right to Try Act—in a letter to House leadership.67 The
patient and provider groups preferred the House version of the Right to Try
bill, which was safer for patients because it established informed consent
standards equivalent to those of EA and its FDA reporting requirements were
more transparent and stringent.68

61. Michael Hiltzik, Right-To-Try Laws Are Hazardous To Your Health—And Now They’re Backed
By The Koch Brothers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018, 2:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/
la-fi-hiltzik-right-to-try-20180122-story.html.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Heffernan et al., supra note 44.
66. Letter from A Twist of Fae-ATS et al., Patient and Provider Orgs., to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S.
House of Reps. & Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Reps (May 21, 2018),
https://www.acscan.org/sites/default/files/National%20Documents/Senate%20Right%20to%20Try%20
%28S.204%29%20Coalition%20Opposition%20Letter%205.21.2018.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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AND

INFORMED

Perhaps the most concerning feature of the federal Right to Try Act is
the section that completely exculpates drug sponsors and manufacturers
and exculpates physicians against ordinary negligence. A prescriber,
dispenser, or other individual entity providing such treatment may only be
found liable as a result of reckless or willful misconduct, gross negligence,
or an intentional tort.69 This feature of the statute was meant to incentivize
drug companies to make investigational drugs available to terminally ill
patients.70 However, tort law is the primary method of dealing with
providers’ medical errors, and without the option of filing negligence
claims, injured patients are left with no legal recourse.71
Another concerning feature of the federal Right to Try Act is that it
leaves patients unprotected without robust informed consent standards.
Medical ethicists have warned against the dangers of investigational drug
treatment.72 Many investigational drugs can hasten death or produce
negative side effects that reduce a patient’s remaining quality of life instead
of heal the patient.73 While the federal Right to Try Act does explicitly
require that the eligible patients provide written informed consent to the
investigational drug treatment, it is silent as to the criteria the informed
consent must meet.74
In the past, courts have used informed consent and adequate warning
as tools to offset limited liability for drug companies. For example, drug
manufacturers in California can avoid strict liability for drug injuries if the
drug is properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of any risks known
at the time of distribution.75 Also, under the learned intermediary doctrine,
drug manufacturers can avoid prescription drug liability for injuries as long
as the manufacturers provide appropriate warning to a patient’s
physician.76 Once the physician has been adequately warned, he or she

69. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (2018).
70. Caiola, supra note 46.
71. Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare
System, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10 (2011).
72. See Interview with Arthur Caplan, NYU Langone Medical Center, ‘Right to try’ law gives
terminal patients access to drugs not approved by FDA, PBS: PBS NEWS HOUR WEEKEND (June 21,
2014, 11:59 AM) https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/right-try-law-gives-terminal-patients-access-nonfda-approved-drugs.
73. Id.
74. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(a)(1)(C) (2018).
75. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 3d 1049, 1069 (Cal. 1988).
76. Id.
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inherits the duty to provide adequate warning to the patient.77 Then, as the
learned intermediary, the physician must provide adequate warning by
obtaining the patient’s informed consent.78
In theory, a patient with informed consent has all the material
information necessary to exercise patient autonomy, but critics have
questioned whether the requirement effectively facilitates truly informed
decisions.79 Genuine informed consent is particularly difficult to attain in
the experimental treatment context because even the physician may not
know how safe or effective the treatment is.80 As mentioned above, some
experimental treatments have only passed Phase I of clinical trials, which
only monitors basic patient safety information.81 Under these
circumstances, because drug sponsors have not tested for efficacy at all, or
completed more thorough tests for safety, physicians administering the
experimental treatments may not be able to provide patients with a precise
idea of the risks the patient should be considering.82
Nonetheless, even if informed consent is not sufficient to allow
patients to make the best medical decisions for themselves, history has
shown that informed consent is at least necessary for patient safety.
In Mink v. University of Chicago, in the early 1950s, the University of
Chicago’s teaching hospital provided over 1,000 women diethylstilbestrol
(“DES”) for “prenatal care.”83 The women did not know until almost two
decades later that the hospital administered the DES to them or that they
were part of a clinical trial sponsored by the manufacturer to determine
whether DES prevented miscarriages.84 Fearing that their children faced an
increased risk of cancer from the in utero exposure to DES, the women
filed a class action lawsuit against the manufacturer and the University.85
The defense argued that the women consented to any course of treatment
by simply entering the hospital for prenatal care.86 The court, however,
disagreed and ruled that the women had genuine claims for battery.87 This
77. Hill v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 943, 954 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
78. Jerica L. Peters, Developments in Science and Technology Law—Part I, State v. Karl: An
Unreasonable Rejection of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 285 (2008).
79. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental
Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 364 (2002).
80. Michael Imbroscio & Gabriel Bell, Adequate Drug Warnings in the Face of Uncertain
Causality: The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and the Need for Clarity, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 847, 859
(2005).
81. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FDA, supra note 12.
82. Imbroscio & Bell, supra note 76.
83. Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1978) [hereinafter Mink].
84. Id.
85. Id. at 718.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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case illustrates why informed consent is necessary as a safeguard against
drug companies exploiting people seeking safe treatment. Without such
safeguards in place, drug companies and physicians embody medical
paternalism and act without regard to public safety by providing
experimental treatment to patients without their knowledge or consent that
potentially exposed more than 1,000 children to cancer as a direct result.88
The idea of informed consent between a physician and a patient is
central to the drug manufacturer’s defense of the learned intermediary
doctrine.89 This doctrine operates as a manufacturer’s defense against
liability by distributing some of the responsibility to warn about the risks
of a prescription drug to the prescribing physician.90 The doctrine provides
that as long as the drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn the physician
about the risks, it does not need to give any warning to the patient.91 Most
states have accepted the learned intermediary doctrine as a common law
defense.92 Typically, exceptions to it are only found in circumstances when
a physician’s ability to provide the patient with informed consent is
diminished, like when the manufacturer directly advertises the drug to the
consumer.93
In Perez v. Wyeth, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that when
mass marketing influences a patient’s choice of prescription drug, the
manufacturer that makes direct claims to consumers regarding the drug’s
efficacy should not be relieved of its duty to provide the consumer with
adequate warnings under the learned intermediary doctrine.94 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey is one of the only courts to apply this exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine, which has not been accepted in federal
court.95 Nonetheless, this narrow exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine clarifies how absolving drug companies from liability is fair when
physician informed consent safeguards are in place, but if the physicianpatient relationship is altered so that adequate informed consent is not
likely to occur, drug companies may still be liable.96 The key feature of the
standard learned intermediary doctrine in absolving drug company liability
is the reliance on the physician as the learned intermediary to provide the
patient with proper information about the dangers or side effects of the
88. See id.
89. Frank C. Woodside & Margaret M. Maggio, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Is it
Eroding?, 52 FED. LAW. 28, 30–32 (2005).
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at 29.
92. Id. at 30.
93. Id. at 32–35.
94. Perez v. Wyeth, 161 N.J. 1, 4 (N.J. 1999) [hereinafter Perez].
95. Id.
96. See id.
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drug.97
In the landmark case, Canterbury v. Spence, the nineteen-year-old
patient, Canterbury, sought treatment for back pain.98 After consulting
different practitioners, he eventually met Doctor Spence, who
recommended that he undergo a laminectomy, which is the excision of the
posterior arch of the vertebra, to correct a suspected ruptured disc.99 Doctor
Spence did not disclose to Canterbury that the recommended surgery posed
a risk of paralysis, and Canterbury did not raise any objections or inquire
further regarding the procedure.100 After the surgery and a series of
complications, Canterbury ended up paralyzed from the waist down and
brought suit against Doctor Spence for his failure to reveal the risk of
paralysis from the procedure.101 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia expounded that “the average patient has little to no
understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to
whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent
decision.”102 The court held that the physician-patient dynamic creates the
need, and therefore, the requirement, for the physician to provide the
patient with the necessary information to make such a decision.103
Adequate warning and informed consent continue to be an issue for
drug manufacturers and physicians.104 In Thom v. Bristol Myers-Squibb
Co., Thom developed permanent penile injury from taking the prescription
drug Serzone to treat his sleep problems and depression.105 Thom sued the
drug manufacturer, Bristol Myers-Squibb, for failure to provide adequate
warning of the risks of permanent penile injury in Serzone’s package
inserts, which caused his physician, Doctor Schueler, to not discuss the
possibility of such risks with Thom prior to prescribing it.106 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of the
manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment due to genuine issues
regarding proximate cause.107
In Parker v. Harper, the Parkers sued Doctor Harper for the failure to
inform them of the potential side effects of Dilantin, which Doctor Harper

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 30–32.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1972) [hereinafter Canterbury].
Id.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 780.
Id.
Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F. 3d 848 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 850 [hereinafter Thom].
Id.
Id. at 858.
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prescribed to treat their minor daughter’s seizures.108 The treatment left her
with disfiguring scars and vision impairment that were more likely than not
symptoms of Steven-Johnson syndrome.109 The Parkers argued that had they
been informed that ingesting Dilantin poses a risk of Stevens-Johnson
syndrome, they would not have consented to the treatment.110 The Louisiana
Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Doctor Harper because there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether he provided the Parkers with informed consent.111
Each of these cases—Mink, Perez, Canterbury, Thom, and Parker—
illustrate the crucial role informed consent plays in a patient’s decision to
accept the risks in treatment.
Courts have consistently supported the idea that as long as patients are
fully informed of the material risks of their medical treatment, then they are
capable of making decisions to accept the treatment, and that decision
absolves the physician and drug manufacturers from liability. As such, it is
a red flag that the new federal Right to Try Act gives drug companies and
physicians so much protection against liability yet does not give patients
equal protection with strong informed consent requirements, as discussed
infra.
1. The Imbalanced Federal Right to Try Act Raises Quality and Individual
Autonomy Issues
Upon taking a closer look at the implications of the imbalanced federal
Right to Try Act, it seems that this federal statute is inconsistent with two
health care principles: quality of care and the preservation of individual
autonomy.
Quality of care is a chief concern of the health-care system, and
informed consent is meant to safeguard against poor quality health care,
amongst other dangers.112 The act of informing patients encourages
physicians to carefully consider their decisions while practicing medicine.113
Further, informed consent requirements formally facilitate trust in the
physician-patient relationship, which is a critical component of providing
quality medical care.114

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
2018)
113.
114.

Parker v. Harper, 803 So. 2d 76, 79 (La. Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Parker].
Id. at 85. Stevens-Johnson syndrome is a skin rash. Id. at 84.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 86.
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1, 132 (8th ed.
Id.
Mark Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 489 (2002).
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Trust is the defining characteristic of the physician-patient relationship,
and preserving it is a prominent objective in health care law and medical
ethics.115 Even the most ordinary illness can create a profound sense of
vulnerability in a patient, which can attack the fundamental unity of mind
and body.116 This deep vulnerability causes many people to revert to a
childlike state with a strong desire to be cared for.117 Psychologically, under
these circumstances, a patient has little choice but to place his or her trust in
a physician, and there is strong evidence that the effectiveness of treatment
depends on that trust.118 This placebo-like effect is one example of how trust
in treatment can enhance healing.119 The phenomenal effects of trust in
health care is largely supported by anecdotal evidence because it is not
empirically studied but most people resonate with the therapeutic benefits of
trust in clinical encounters.120
Along with quality, individual autonomy is another chief concern
within the health-care system.121 The information physicians provide to
patients fosters rational decision-making by the patient and promotes
individual autonomy.122 The doctrine of informed consent is based on the
principle of bodily self-determination—the notion that “every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body.”123 As such, patients exercise their right to autonomy
with informed consent.124 Without informed consent, patients may lose
autonomy by making decisions without fully understanding the proposed
treatment or its full benefits and risks.125 Moreover, the principles of quality
health care and patient autonomy are intertwined, as research also suggests
that patients exercising autonomy by being fully involved in the management
of their treatment leads to better quality healthcare.126
Given the risks associated with a terminally ill patient’s circumstances,
having trust and reliance on a conscientious physician is especially
important.127 As such, a health care statute that does not have robust informed
consent requirements may give way to poor quality health care and neglect

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 471.
Id. at 477–78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 482.
Furrow, supra note 108.
Id.
Peters, supra note 74, at 299.
See id.
Id.
Furrow, supra note 108, at 133.
Caplan, supra note 68.
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of the principles of patient autonomy.
2. Solution: Heightened Informed Consent Will Offset Liability Issues
Generally, adequate informed consent is obtained when a patient
understands their diagnosis or nature of the problem, the nature and purposes
of the proposed treatment, reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the
treatment and the likelihood of the occurrence of risk, potential severity of
the risks, reasonable alternatives and the benefits and risks of those
alternatives, and the probable risks and benefits of foregoing the proposed
treatment.128 The FDA deems that adequate informed consent is obtained in
clinical trials for investigational drugs when the patient has signed a written
statement that describes and explains the research.129 EA also incorporates
the same informed consent requirements.130 The description must include
reasonably foreseeable risks, discomfort, or benefits from the drug, what
appropriate alternative treatments exist, that the treatment may involve
unforeseeable risks, and any consequences that would follow a decision to
withdraw from the clinical trial.131
Although previous federal Right to Try bills referenced an informed
consent section, the enacted federal Right to Try Act is silent as to the
standards of informed consent for investigational drug treatment.132 Silence
on the informed consent issue could be detrimental to the quality of health
care these already terminally ill patients receive, as well as strip them of what
little autonomy they have left. It may be possible that courts could interpret
the Federal Right to Try Act to incorporate the FDA’s clinical trial informed
consent requirements as parts of the same legislative scheme. However,
those informed consent criteria may not be appropriate because the research
purpose of providing drugs under clinical trials is inherently different from
the purpose of providing treatment under the Right to Try Act.133 Thus,
section 360bbb-oa(a)(1)(C), which requires eligible investigational drug
patients to provide written informed consent, must be amended to
incorporate informed consent requirements suitable for a Right to Try
patient’s circumstances.
A proposed solution to this issue is to amend the federal Right to Try

128. Peters, supra note 74.
129. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2011).
130. General responsibilities of investigators, 84 Fed. Reg. 5968-02, 312, 812 (proposed Feb. 25,
2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.60); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(1) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4)
(2009).
131. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2011).
132. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-oa(a)(1)(C) (2018).
133. Noah, supra note 75, at 388.
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Act to reflect California’s state Right to Try Act’s (“California Act”)134
robust informed consent standards specifically aimed toward informing
terminally ill patients of the implications of using investigational drugs for
treatment. The California Right to Try Act contains a comprehensive list of
elements of informed consent for investigational drug treatment.135 Under
the California Right to Try Act, written informed consent must include an
explanation of existing approved products and treatments for the disease or
condition and the potentially best and worst outcomes of the new treatment,
including new, unanticipated, different, or worse symptoms that may
result.136 The description must also disclose that death could be hastened by
the treatment.137 These California informed consent criteria take into account
that terminally ill patients may be so desperate for marginal results that they
may not fully comprehend the risks of their condition worsening as a result
of going through investigational treatment.
Another solution to the problem of the federal Right to Try Act’s
lacking informed consent requirements is to incorporate the measures
required by Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (“Oregon Act”). Laws such as
the Oregon Act dealing with a different type of end-of-life decision making,
known as Right to Die statutes, have heightened requirements in evaluating
whether a patient’s end-of-life decision is one that is fully informed.138 While
some terminally ill patients seek experimental treatment to save their lives,
other terminally ill patients seek medical aid in dying.139 State Right to Die
laws, such as Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, require that a physician
provide information on the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis, potential risks
associated with, and probable result of, taking the medication, and available
feasible alternatives.140 Additionally, Oregon requires that the patient submit
a signed and dated written request, with two witnesses as well as an oral
request, that has been reiterated to the physician within fifteen days of the
original request.141 Further, the physician must verify that the patient is
making an informed decision, and if he or she feels that a patient’s judgment
is impaired due to psychiatric or psychological order or depression, then the
physician must refer the patient for counseling.142 Here, we have two
analogous situations where terminally ill patients are making end-of-life
134. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (2019).
135. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (2019).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Furrow, supra note 108, at 1450.
139. Medically assisted death is “medical care designed to help a patient die how and when the
patient wants to die.” Id. at 1425.
140. Id. at 1450.
141. Id. at 1453.
142. Id. at 1452.
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decisions that will, or likely will, result in death. As such, the set of laws
governing rational decision making in each circumstance should be equally
robust.
Patients who are facing end-of-life medical decisions are subject to
external pressure, whether it is familial, financial, or other.143 As such, other
laws besides the federal Right to Try Act regulating terminally ill patients
making end-of-life decisions require some form of heightened informed
consent to ensure that the patient is making a rational decision; under EA,
for example, the FDA requires IRB approval of informed consent.144 As
another example, the California Act informed consent requirement includes
language tailored to ensure that a patient understands he or she is facing
death.145 Finally, the extensive protective requirements in the Oregon Act
were put in place as mechanisms to protect vulnerable patients against illadvised rejection of life-sustaining treatment.146 Moreover, courts have also
emphasized that where an experiment is risky and of uncertain benefit to the
patient, the adequacy of the patient’s informed consent should be closely
scrutinized.147
Going against this trend, the federal Right to Try Act removes those
important heightened protections for patients by bypassing FDA
requirements and IRB approval.148 In conjunction with absolving drug
companies and physicians of liability, this leaves already vulnerable patients
extremely unprotected, which is unacceptable. However, if the federal Right
to Try Act adopts California’s and Oregon’s heightened informed consent
requirements, this may compensate for its limited liability feature. Such an
amendment would keep limited liability intact, which would appease drug
companies and physicians, and still allow a proactive protection of quality
care and patient autonomy.

B. CONCERNS REGARDING EXPLOITATION
PATIENTS

OF

TERMINALLY ILL

Since its enactment, there has been widespread fear that the federal
Right to Try Act will bring about ethical consequences with drug companies
and sponsors commoditizing desperation, finding ways to profiteer from the

143. Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35 HOUS. L.
REV. 1393, 1435 (1999).
144. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4) (2009).
145. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111548.1(h) (2019).
146. Meisel, supra note 138, at 1434.
147. Jennifer Piel, Informed Consent in Right-To-Try Cases, 44 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 290 (2016).
148. Id.
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new avenue of putting non-FDA approved drugs on the market.149 Critics
claim that the federal Right to Try Act will legitimize what is known as the
“Burzynski practice model,”150 a business model whereby the highly
controversial Doctor Stanislaw Burzynski (“Burzynski”) provided treatment
to cancer patients as an alternative to chemotherapy for the price of $20,000
to start, and $7,500 per month to continue.151 In the late 1990s, Burzynski
was prosecuted for violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, and he
was ordered to administer his drugs exclusively through FDA clinical
trials.152 Since then, Burzynski has still been able to treat his patients through
Phase II clinical trials, but virtually none of his treatments pass on to Phase
III.153 After decades of implementing treatments that have not yet proven
effective, Burzynski has gained a bad reputation for profiting by taking
advantage of his sick and vulnerable patients.154 According to the U.S.
National Institute of Health, Burzynski started over sixty medical studies
over the years, but has only completed one, with the status of “unknown” or
“withdrawn” for virtually all of his remaining studies.155 Now that the federal
Right to Try Act allows investigational drug treatment without the
requirement that patients be enrolled in Phase II clinical trials at all, there is
concern that it will be even easier for Burzynski to continue and other
companies to follow his business model.156
New companies are already appearing, ready to do business under the
federal Right to Try Act, such as Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics Inc.
(“Brainstorm”).157 Brainstorm is a small biotechnology company that plans
on offering investigational cell therapy treatment to patients with Lou
Gehrig’s disease, which its CEO estimates will cost patients over
$300,000.158 Additionally, Brainstorm has plans to offer an investigational
treatment called NurOwn to help patients who have amyotrophic lateral

149. Max Nisen, ‘Right-to-Try’ Drug Law Offers No Miracle Cure, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-24/right-to-try-drug-law-risks-exploiting-despera
te-patients.
150. David Gorski, Right-to-Try is Now Law. Let Patients Beware!, SCIENCE BASED MED. (June 4,
2018), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/right-to-try-is-now-law-let-patients-beware/.
151. Cancer Doctor Under Fire for Providing False Hope to Patients, FOX NEWS, (Nov. 18, 2013),
https://www.foxnews.com/health/cancer-doctor-under-fire-for-providing-false-hope-to-patients.
152. Gorski, supra note 145.
153. Id.
154. FOX NEWS, supra note 146.
155. Id.
156. Gorski, supra note 145.
157. Michelle Cortez, The ‘Right to Try’ Could Cost Dying Patients a Fortune, BLOOMBERG (June
20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/the-price-to-try-a-drug-could-be-300000-for-dying-patients.
158. Id.
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sclerosis, or ALS, for an estimated $375,000.159 As insurers typically do not
offer coverage for unproven treatment methods, terminally ill patients will
be adding serious financial risk to their grave medical conditions.160
1. Protecting Patients versus Scientific Innovation
The U.S. health care industry has long been subject to health care price
gouging161 and profiteering. Total U.S. health care spending reached $3.3
trillion in 2016, which was 17.9% of the GDP.162 Among the eleven
developed nations, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, the U.S. spends the most money on health care and is ranked
as the worst performing.163 In 2014, these nations spent 9%, 10%, 11.1%,
11%, 10.9%, 9.4%, 9.3%, 11.2%, 11.4%, 9.9%, and 16.6% of their GDP on
health care, respectively.164 As the money is apparently not going toward
quality health care, it is worth pointing out that the U.S. health care industry’s
total annual profit in 2009 was $200 billion, with a median annual
compensation of more than $12.4 million for CEO’s at big health care
companies, surpassing finance CEO’s by two-thirds.165 For-profit and nonprofit health insurance companies, hospital operators, laboratory testing
companies, and health care real estate investment trusts, are all among the
parties that stand to profit from the industry, but “Big Pharma” is “the 800pound gorilla in the room,” with more than $300 billion in annual revenue.166
Since 1980, the pharmaceutical industry’s share of the GDP has more than
tripled.167
Despite this critique, the industry’s innovations have undeniably
increased life expectancy and quality for countless lives.168 Since 2000, the
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) defines ‘gouging’ as “the unlawful or unfair raising of
prices.”
162. Micah Hartman et al., National Health Care Spending in 2016: Spending and Enrollment
Growth Slow After Initial Coverage Expansions, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.health
affairs.org/doi/abs/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1299.
163. Ryan Bort, How Bad is U.S. Health Care? Among High Income Nations, It’s the Worst, Study
Says, NEWSWEEK (July 14, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/united-states-health-care-rated-worst637114.
158. Eric C. Schneider et al., Mirror, Mirror 2017: International Comparison Reflects Flaws and
Opportunities for Better U.S. Health Care, THE COMMON WEALTH FUND (July, 2017), https://interacti
ves.commonwealthfund.org/2017/july/mirror-mirror/.
165. Matt Kapp, The Sick Business of Health-Care Profiteering, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 24, 2009),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2009/09/health-care200909.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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top pharmaceutical Research and Development (“R&D”) spenders,
including Roche, Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, Pfizer, Merck, BristolMyers Squibb, AstraZeneca, Sanofi, Eli Lilly, and GlaxoSmithKline,169 have
increased their R&D spending annually by a growth rate of 1.76%.170 R&D
spending is what yields success in scientific innovation.171 For example, in
2004, Janssen, a Johnson & Johnson company, made a breakthrough
discovery of a new anti-tuberculosis treatment, which received FDA
Accelerated Approval in 2012 and was proven to be highly effective in
curing tuberculosis.172 Novartis also pushed through big medical
breakthrough in 2017, when it received FDA approval for a CAR-T cell
therapy called Kymriah, used to treat cancer in children.173 Such medical
breakthroughs are critical in the advancement of society and are made
possible because drug companies have the profits to spend on R&D.174
The controversy surrounding pharmaceutical price regulation is
generations old. Drug companies have made a profound impact on millions
of lives, fighting illnesses that account for a substantial portion of the
nation’s health problems, such as arthritis, asthma, Alzheimer’s disease,
heart disease, Crohn’s disease, cancer, multiple sclerosis, Lou Gehrig’s
disease, and AIDS.175 Unfortunately, as medicine advances, the price tag on
pharmaceuticals increase at an alarming rate, as well, sometimes to the point
of price gouging.176 In the past, this has led to government regulation of
pharmaceuticals, such as the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which
created abbreviated regulatory pathways for generic versions of chemical
drugs to reach the market.177 Today, the government is attempting to regulate
generic versions of biologics in a similar way.178 Other attempts to regulate

169. John Carroll, The 15 Top R&D Spenders in the Global Biopharma Business: 2016, ENDPOINTS
NEWS (July 13, 2016), https://endpts.com/top-pharma-biotech-research-development-budgets/.
170. Frank David, Pharma’s Not So Stingy With R&D After All, FORBES (May 14, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/frankdavid/2017/05/14/pharma-rd-2005-2015/#3894622931c1.
171. Id.
172. Hallie Levine, The Quest to End Tuberculosis: 13 Memorable Moments in Innovation,
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.jnj.com/innovation/key-moments-tuberculosistreatment-history.
173. Novartis Receives First Ever FDA Approval for a CAR-T Cell Therapy, Kymriah(TM)
(CTL019), for Children and Young Adults with B-cell ALL That is Refractory or Has Relapsed at Least
Twice, NOVARTIS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/novartis-receivesfirst-ever-fda-approval-car-t-cell-therapy-kymriahtm-ctl019-children-and-young-adults-b-cell-all-refra
ctory-or-has-relapsed-least-twice.
174. David, supra note 164.
175. Brian R. Bouggy, Follow-On Biologics Legislation: Striking A Balance Between Innovation
and Affordability, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 367, 368 (2010).
176. Id. at 369.
177. Id. at 374.
178. Id. at 347.
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the pharmaceutical industry include price control and price transparency.179
These regulatory efforts open the debate of whether competition is harmful
or helpful in the long run and if price regulation is necessary.180 Opponents
of regulation argue that studies show that price control is harmful to longterm research and development because it reduces research investment,
which stifles the discovery of promising therapies, leading to a shortage of
life-enhancing and life-saving treatments.181 They argue instead that
competition is the best way to lower prices while maintaining incentives for
innovation, and that price transparency laws may be able to assist.182 The
federal Right to Try Act pathway to experimental drugs creates an analogous
dilemma between providing affordable life-saving treatment and allowing
the pharmaceutical industry to act freely and stimulate competition.
2. Solution: Anti-Price Gouging and FDA Inclusion Will Provide Middle
Ground
Drug companies are for-profit corporations that need incentives in order
to produce products; it is unrealistic to expect them not to charge patients for
investigational drugs.183 One proposed solution is to amend the federal Right
to Try Act to include an anti-price gouging section. In 2017, Maryland
passed HB 631, “[a]n Act concerning Public Health- Essential Off-Patent or
Generic Drugs-Price Gouging-Prohibition” (“Maryland Act”), a state price
gouging law enacted to prevent the sharp increase in price of generic drugs
and safeguard Maryland residents’ access to prescription drugs.184 The
Maryland Act defined “price gouging” as “an unconscionable increase in the
price of a prescription drug.”185 The Maryland Act further defined
“unconscionable increase” as one that is “excessive and not justified by the
cost of producing the drug or the cost of appropriate expansion of access to
the drug to promote public health” and “results in consumers having no
meaningful choice about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price”
due to the consumer’s conditions.186 Unfortunately, one year later, the United
179. Matthew Glans, Research & Commentary: Drug Price Controls and Price Transparency, THE
HEARTLAND INST. (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.heartland.org/publications-resources/publications
/research--commentary-drug-price-controls-and-price-transparency?source=policybot.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Cortez, supra note 152.
184. Ian Duncan, Maryland Law Against Price-Gouging by Drug Companies is Unconstitutional,
Appeals Court Rules, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan
d/bs-md-drug-price-gouging-unconstitutional-20180413-story.html.
185. Ass’n for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F. 3d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 2018).
186. Id.
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States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the law
unconstitutionally violated the Dormant Commerce Clause as a direct stateimposed limitation on interstate commerce.187 However, a price-gouging
amendment to the federal Right to Try Act would not run into the same
Dormant Commerce Clause issues because the federal government holds a
constitutional right to regulate interstate commerce, and should therefore be
constitutional.188
Although pharmaceutical anti-price-gouging laws that prohibit
unconscionable price increases do protect consumers in disaster markets,
price-gouging regulations in general raise potentially serious long-term
economic effects.189 Opponents claim that artificially low prices from antiprice-gouging laws quickly create shortages and end up creating higher
transactional costs for buyers.”190 Also, sellers may face a higher cost of
operation for a lower or similarly priced good, which may cause the seller to
stop selling.191 However, as legitimate as these concerns are, the market for
experimental drugs is distinguished from the typical disaster market in which
general price gouging occurs, in that the gouging is due to having an
untreatable terminal illness rather than sharing in a state of disaster such as
a hurricane.192 Also, the expensive price of experimental drugs is not per se
due to a high consumer demand, but rather due to drug companies financial
interests in covering costs and profiting.193 Therefore, the long-term
economic concerns that critics raise over general price-gouging laws may
not apply in the context of the federal Right to Try Act.
Another proposed solution is to re-incorporate FDA oversight over the
price setting of experimental drugs. The FDA already monitors charging for
investigational drugs under EA.194 If a sponsor is providing a patient with a
drug under EA, it must obtain FDA authorization to charge for that drug.195
The FDA will authorize charging if the sponsor submits documentation that
shows calculations reviewed and approved by an independent certified
public accountant that comply with the recoverable costs.196 The recoverable

187. Id. at 693.
188. See id. at 666.
189. Duncan, supra note 179; Emily Bae, Are Anti-Price Gouging Legislations Effective Against
Sellers During Disasters?, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 79, 80–83 (2009).
190. Bae, supra note 184, at 82.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See id.; Cortez, supra note 152.
194. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2009).
195. Id. A sponsor “means a person who takes responsibility for and initiates a clinical investigation.
The sponsor may be an individual or pharmaceutical company, governmental agency, academic
institution, private organization, or other organization.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b).
196. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2009).
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costs may only include the direct costs of manufacturing and making the
investigational drug available, such as the cost of “raw materials, labor, and
nonreusable supplies and equipment used to manufacture the quantity of
drug needed for which charging is authorized.”197 Incorporating FDA
oversight into the charging of experimental drugs under the federal Right to
Try Act might defeat the purpose behind the Act of eliminating the FDA’s
role in giving patients access to experimental drugs.198 However, requiring
the federal Right to Try Act to limit charges on direct costs, as the FDA
already requires under EA, is the middle ground that protects patients from
being financially exploited by drug companies and also ensures that drug
companies will at least recover direct manufacturing costs for providing the
experimental drugs.

V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the federal Right to Try Act as currently enacted is
imbalanced to favor drug companies because it raises issues of quality,
individual autonomy, and financial exploitation of vulnerable patients. The
issues of quality and individual autonomy must be addressed by amending
the Act to include robust informed consent requirements as seen in
California’s version of the Right to Try Act and in Oregon’s similar Death
with Dignity Act. Such amendments would protect terminally ill patients in
the same way that the federal Right to Try Act currently protects drug
companies and physicians from liability for experimental treatment. As for
the financial exploitation issues, adding amendments to the federal Right to
Try Act that incorporates anti-price-gouging law or incorporates FDA
oversight of charging for only direct costs of investigational drugs should
protect vulnerable patients without chilling scientific innovation incentives.

***

197.
198.

21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d) (2009).
See Hiltzik, supra note 57.

